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Tax Sparing and Direct Investment
in Developing Countries
James R. Hines Jr.
2.1 Introduction
Only a small fraction of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is
located in developing countries. In 1990, countries that were not members
of the OECD received roughly 15 percent of the $200 billion of world
FDI. Since these developing countries account for 35 percent of world
GDP in 1990 (and 80 percent of the world’s population), they received a
much smaller fraction of total FDI than even their relatively modest eco-
nomic activity levels appear to warrant. Numerous explanations have been
advanced to account for the unwillingness of investors to locate FDI in the
developing world, explanations that typically focus on distances to ﬁnal
markets, the diﬃculty or cost of obtaining important factors of produc-
tion, inhospitable legal and regulatory environments, and the relatively un-
developed state of public infrastructure such as roads, port facilities, and
telecommunications.1 Although the large number of available explanations
can make it diﬃcult to identify the most important determinants of FDI,
many explanations share the feature that poor local economic conditions
discourage FDI that might otherwise contribute to local economic devel-
opment.
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ness School and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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1. See, e.g., Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996), who note that the share of world FDI
received by developing countries has risen since 1990. Data reported by the United Nations
(1997, 303) indicate that the developing countries received 18 percent of world FDI ﬂows
over the 1985–90 period, and close to 35 percent of world FDI ﬂows over the 1991–95 period.
39High-income countries are generally eager to promote economic devel-
opment in low-income parts of the world. With that goal (and others) in
mind, they often provide special ﬁscal incentives for their own ﬁrms to do
business in developing countries. This paper examines the eﬀe c to ft h e
most common of these incentives, the provision of “tax sparing” credits.
“Tax sparing” is a practice designed to promote the eﬀectiveness of local
tax incentives for foreign investment. Developing countries are often will-
ing to provide foreign investors signiﬁcant ﬁscal incentives in order to en-
courage FDI and thereby stimulate local economic growth. Popular in-
centives include lengthy tax holidays, expensing or other generous tax
treatment of new investment expenditures, and other tax reductions, as
well as providing roads, worker training, and other public inputs at below-
market prices. Tax incentives have the ability to stimulate foreign invest-
ment eﬀectively and eﬃciently. Home-country tax systems may, however,
reduce—or in some cases completely remove—incentives created by host-
country tax abatements through corresponding increases in home-country
tax burdens.
As an example, a multinational ﬁrm headquartered in a home country
(such as the United States or Japan) that operates a residence-based
worldwide tax system and grants foreign tax credits may ﬁnd that tax re-
ductions oﬀered as investment incentives by host countries are exactly oﬀ-
set by higher home-country taxes. The reason is that host-country tax re-
ductions imply that the ﬁrm can claim fewer foreign tax credits against
home-country tax obligations.
In reaction to this possibility, many governments provide tax sparing
credits for investments in developing countries. Tax sparing is the practice
by which capital-exporting countries amend their taxation of foreign
source income to allow ﬁrms to retain the advantages of tax reductions
provided by host countries. Speciﬁcally, tax sparing often takes the form
of allowing ﬁrms to claim foreign tax credits against home-country tax
liabilities for taxes that would have been paid to foreign governments, in
the absence of special abatements, on income from investments in certain
developing countries. Since foreign tax credits are then based on tax obli-
gations calculated without regard to taxes actually paid, any special tax
breaks oﬀered by host-country governments enhance the after-tax proﬁt-
ability of foreign investors and are not simply oﬀset by higher home-
country taxes.
The practice of granting tax sparing credits is controversial, coming un-
der ﬁre from critics who claim that tax sparing credits are ineﬀective in
encouraging greater investment in developing countries.2 The purpose of
this paper is to evaluate this claim. Speciﬁcally, the paper compares pat-
terns of Japanese and U.S. FDI over the same time period. Japan permits
2. See, e.g., the arguments advanced in OECD (1998).
40 James R. Hines Jr.its ﬁrms to claim tax sparing credits for investments in certain developing
countries, while the United States does not. Holding other considerations
constant, it follows that, to the extent that tax sparing is eﬀective, Japanese
ﬁrms will exhibit greater willingness than U.S. ﬁrms to invest in developing
countries. In addition, Japanese ﬁrms are more likely than U.S. ﬁrms to
receive special tax breaks from countries with whom Japan has tax spar-
ing agreements.
The results indicate that tax sparing is eﬀective in stimulating FDI. Jap-
anese ﬁrms locate a much higher fraction of their foreign investment in
countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements than do U.S. ﬁrms.
Furthermore, host governments appear to grant Japanese ﬁrms signiﬁcant
tax reductions that are not available to their U.S. counterparts. All other
things being equal, tax sparing agreements are associated with 140–240
percent higher FDI levels and 23 percent lower tax rates on FDI.
Since Japan does not randomly assign tax sparing agreements to devel-
oping countries, one interpretation of the FDI evidence is that low-income
countries with whom Japan has signiﬁcant economic relations due to geo-
graphic proximity or cultural connections are those with whom Japan, in
turn, decides to sign tax sparing agreements. In order to evaluate this inter-
pretation, the regressions are rerun using, as an instrument for Japanese
tax sparing, the existence of a tax sparing agreement between the United
Kingdom and the country in question. The United Kingdom has a tax
system very similar to Japan’s and is likewise a major capital exporter that
grants tax sparing for investments in a large number of developing coun-
tries—but the United Kingdom’s geographical and cultural connections
diﬀerfrom Japan’s.The resultsobtainedusing U.K.tax sparingagreements
as instruments for Japanese tax sparing agreements are very similar to
those generated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that take
Japanese tax sparing to be exogenous.
These results are consistent with a growing body of recent evidence that
tax systems inﬂuence the volume and location of FDI. Much of this evi-
dence concerns the activity of U.S. ﬁrms, or of foreign ﬁrms investing in
the United States, so it is useful to compare the behavior of U.S. ﬁrms to
that of ﬁrms from a country, such as Japan, that has an otherwise similar
tax system that diﬀers in one important respect (tax sparing). The results
are particularly impressive in light of the fact that host countries with
whom Japan has tax sparing agreements face incentives to substitute tax
incentives for nontax investment incentives they would otherwise oﬀer Jap-
anese ﬁrms. Since nontax investment incentives are diﬃcult to verify and
impossible to quantify, they are omitted from the regressions; so, to the
degree that such incentives inﬂuence investment patterns, there is likely to
be a bias against ﬁnding an important eﬀect of tax sparing on the volume
of FDI.
Section 2.2 of the paper reviews the tax treatment of foreign investment
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2.3 presents a model of the eﬀect of tax sparing on FDI when host govern-
ments provide tax and nontax inducements to foreign investors. Section
2.3 also describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 pre-
sents the regression results. Section 2.5 is the conclusion.
2.2 Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment
In order to appreciate the likely eﬀect of Japanese willingness (and U.S.
reluctance) to grant tax sparing for investments in developing countries, it
is useful ﬁrst to review important aspects of the Japanese and U.S. systems
of taxing foreign source income.3 This review is greatly simpliﬁed by the
strong similarities between the two tax systems. This section considers the
likely implications of tax sparing given existing evidence of the eﬀect of
taxation on the volume and location of FDI.
2.2.1 Japanese and U.S. Taxation of FDI
Both Japan and the United States tax income on a residence basis,
meaning that corporations and individuals owe taxes to their home gov-
ernments on all of their worldwide incomes, whether earned at home or
abroad. In order to avoid subjecting multinationals to double taxation,
Japan and the United States permit ﬁrms to claim foreign tax credits for
income taxes (and related taxes) paid to foreign governments.4 The U.S.
corporate tax rate is currently 35 percent. Under the foreign tax credit
system, a U.S. corporation that earns $100 in a foreign country with a 15
percent tax rate pays a tax of $15 to the foreign government and $20 to
the U.S. government, since its U.S. corporate tax liability of $35 (35 percent
of $100) is reduced to $20 by the foreign tax credit of $15.
Tax Deferral
Under both Japanese and U.S. law, ﬁrms must pay taxes to home gov-
ernments on their worldwide incomes, with the exception that a certain
category of foreign income is temporarily excluded from home-country
taxation. The excluded category is the unrepatriated portion of the proﬁts
earned by foreign subsidiaries; taxpayers are permitted to defer any home-
country tax liability on those proﬁts until they are paid as dividends to
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3. Portions of the following brief description of U.S. law are excerpted from Hines (1991,
1997) and Hines and Hubbard (1995).
4. Japan and the United States are not alone in taxing the worldwide income of their
resident companies while permitting ﬁrms to claim foreign tax credits. Other countries with
such systems include Greece, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Under Japanese and
U.S. law, ﬁrms may claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid by foreign aﬃliates of which they
own at least 10 percent, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable.parent ﬁrms resident in Japan or the United States.5 This deferral is avail-
able only on the active business proﬁts of foreign aﬃliates that are sepa-
rately incorporated as subsidiaries in foreign countries. The proﬁts of unin-
corporated foreign businesses, such as those of Japanese or U.S. branch
banksinothercountries,aretaxedimmediatelybytheirhomegovernments.
To illustrate deferral, consider the case of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S.
ﬁrm that earns $200 in a foreign country without corporate taxes. This
subsidiary might remit $50 in dividends to its parent U.S. company, using
the remaining $150 to reinvest in its own, foreign, operations. The U.S.
parent ﬁrm must then pay U.S. taxes on the $50 of dividends it receives,
but is not required to pay U.S. taxes on any part of the $150 that the
subsidiary earns abroad and does not remit to its parent company. If, how-
ever, the subsidiary were to pay a dividend of $150 the following year, the
ﬁrm would then be required to pay U.S. tax on that amount. Japanese,
and to a greater extent, American, laws restrict the ability of ﬁrms to avoid
home-country taxes by delaying the repatriation of lightly taxed foreign
earnings. American laws do so by recharacterizing income from passive
investments, conduit income, and funds reinvested in home countries as
“deemed distributed” and therefore immediately taxable by home govern-
ments. Japanese laws do so with rules restricting the ability of subsidiaries
to defer home taxation of proﬁts earned in foreign tax havens.
Excess Foreign Tax Credits
The Japanese and U.S. governments permit ﬁrms to claim foreign tax
credits, doing so with the understanding that these policies reduce tax col-
lections on any given amount of foreign source income. The foreign tax
credit is intended to reduce the problems created by international double
taxation, since, in the absence of some kind of correction, the combined
burdens of host-country and home-country taxation might eﬀectively pro-
hibit most international business transactions. Consequently, governments
design their foreign tax credit systems to prevent ﬁrms from using foreign
tax credits to reduce home-country tax liabilities that arise from proﬁts
earned within home countries.
There are limits on the foreign tax credits that Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms
may claim; a ﬁrm’s foreign tax credit limit equals the home-country tax li-
ability generated by its foreign source income. For example, with a U.S. tax
rate of 35 percent, an American ﬁrm with $200 in foreign income faces a
foreign tax credit limit of $70 (35 percent of $200). If the ﬁrm paid foreign
income taxes of less than $70, then the ﬁrm would be entitled to claim
5. Deferral of home-country taxation of the unrepatriated proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries is
a common feature of systems that tax foreign incomes. Other countries that permit this kind
of deferral include Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Pakistan, and the
United Kingdom.
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paid $95 in foreign taxes, it would be permitted to claim no more than $70
in foreign tax credits.
Firms described by this second case, in which foreign tax payments
exceed the foreign tax credit limit, are said to have “excess foreign tax
credits”; the excess foreign tax credits represent the portion of foreign tax
payments exceeding home-country tax liabilities generated by foreign in-
comes. Firms described by the ﬁrst case, in which foreign tax payments
are smaller than the foreign tax credit limit, are said to have “deﬁcit foreign
tax credits.” Under Japanese and U.S. law, ﬁrms may use excess foreign tax
credits in one year to reduce their tax obligations in other years. Japanese
ﬁrms are allowed to apply any excess foreign tax credits against their Japa-
nese tax obligations in the three previous years or in any of the following
three years; American ﬁrms are allowed to apply any excess foreign tax
credits against U.S. tax obligations in the two previous years or in any of
the following ﬁve years. Foreign tax credits are not adjusted for inﬂation
when applied against tax obligations in other years.
In practice, the calculation of the foreign tax credit limit entails many
complications not reviewed here. One is that Japanese and U.S. laws re-
quire ﬁrms to use all of their worldwide foreign incomes to calculate for-
eign tax credit limits. Firms then have excess foreign tax credits if their
worldwide foreign income tax payments exceed this limit.6 This procedure
is known as “worldwide averaging.”
Tax Sparing
The term “tax sparing” denotes the practice of amending home-country
taxation in a way that permits investors to receive the full beneﬁts of tax
reductions by host countries. Many high-income capital-exporting coun-
tries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom,
oﬀer one form or another of tax sparing for investments in certain devel-
oping countries.7 In the cases of Japan and the United Kingdom, who have
tax systems very similar to that of the United States, tax sparing typically
takes the form of permitting ﬁrms to claim foreign tax credits for foreign
6. Not all countries that grant foreign tax credits use worldwide averaging. For example,
the United Kingdom instead requires its ﬁrms to calculate foreign tax credits on an activity-
by-activity basis. The United States at one time required ﬁrms to calculate separate foreign
tax credit limits for each country to whom taxes were paid; the current system of worldwide
averaging was introduced in the mid-1970s.
7. For a survey of tax sparing practices, see OECD (1998). As the OECD report notes,
tax sparing is an issue for countries that routinely exempt most foreign income from taxation,
since certain categories of passive foreign income are generally not exempt from home-
country taxation. Furthermore, countries that ordinarily exempt foreign income from taxa-
tion usually apply antiavoidance regimes that subject foreign income to taxation (while grant-
ing foreign tax credits) if the foreign income is very lightly taxed by host governments.
44 James R. Hines Jr.taxes that would be paid in the absence of special tax abatements. As a
result, the beneﬁts of any host-country tax abatements are not oﬀset by
reductions in the foreign tax credits that investors can claim against home-
country tax liabilities. This consideration is important to the extent that
ﬁrms have deﬁcit foreign tax credits and would incur signiﬁcant costs in
deferring repatriation of foreign proﬁts to years in which there would be
no associated home-country tax liability.8
Japan and the United Kingdom grant tax sparing credits through the
terms of bilateral treaties with low-income countries. The Japanese gov-
ernment explains that it grants such credits in order to maintain the ability
of developing countries to use ﬁscal incentives to attract Japanese FDI.9
The United States has been unwilling to grant tax sparing in any of its
bilateral tax treaties, though the issue has arisen on numerous occasions.
The most visible episode took place in 1957, when the United States signed
a treaty with Pakistan providing that the United States would grant tax
sparing credits for American investments in Pakistan. At the time, Paki-
stan granted tax concessions to qualifying enterprises making new invest-
ments in certain industries. Under the terms of the treaty, American inves-
tors in Pakistan would be entitled to claim foreign tax credits for the taxes
they would have paid to Pakistan absent the special concessions granted
by the Pakistani law.
U.S. tax treaties are not legally binding unless and until ratiﬁed by the
U.S. Senate. After extensive hearings and deliberations, and amid consid-
erable controversy,10 the U.S. Senate ratiﬁed the Pakistan treaty, but in so
doing struck from the treaty its tax sparing provision. In subsequent treat-
ies over the following forty-three years the United States has been unwill-
ing to provide tax sparing for investments in any country.11 In opposing
8. See Hartman (1985), Sinn (1993), and Hines (1994) for analyses of the incentives created
by foreign tax credits and deferral of home-country taxation. For evidence of the eﬀect of
home-country taxation on dividend repatriations, see Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler
and Newlon (1993), and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995).
9. “Many developing countries have introduced various tax incentives in order to attract
investment from abroad. Without the tax-sparing credit system, even if such tax incentive
exempts Japanese investors from tax in a foreign country, they are taxed on worldwide income
in Japan and the spared amount will only be transferred from the treasury of the developing
country to that of Japan through smaller foreign tax credits allowed in Japan. The result is
that no tax beneﬁts remain in the hands of the investors. Therefore, the tax-sparing credit
system does not annul the eﬀect of tax incentives adopted by developing countries” (Japanese
Ministry of Finance 1996, 122).
10. See U.S. Senate (1957). For samples of the ensuing controversy, see Crockett (1958)
and Surrey (1958).
11. As Tillinghast (1996) notes, the Senate persists in rejecting not only treaties with tax
sparing provisions but also those with creative alternatives. The signed, but unratiﬁed, 1967
Brazil-U.S. treaty contained a clause granting U.S. investors an investment tax credit, for
investments in Brazil, that would be used to reduce U.S. tax liabilities on foreign source
income. A similar type of investment tax credit was then available for domestic investments
in the United States. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty with the investment tax credit
provision. American intransigence concerning tax sparing is further illustrated by the fact
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tax sparing for investments in Pakistan would pressure the United States
to provide tax sparing in all of its treaties with developing countries,12 and
that such concessions are unwise and excessively costly. Furthermore, the
Pakistan treaty raised fears of encouraging FDI at the expense of invest-
ment in the United States.
2.2.2 Eﬀect of Taxation on FDI
During the deliberations over Senate ratiﬁcation of the Pakistan treaty,
Stanley Surrey (1958) could conﬁdently assert that there was no reliable
evidence that tax-based incentives, such as those created by tax sparing
provisions, were likely to inﬂuence the pattern of FDI. That is an appro-
priate summary of the quantitative literature as it existed at the time. Now,
more than forty years later, there is a considerable body of evidence, much
of it recent, that documents a sizable eﬀect of tax policies on the location
and volume of FDI. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect tax sparing
provisions to encourage direct investment and to aﬀect host-country poli-
cies toward foreign investors.
Evidence of the eﬀect of taxation on FDI comes in a variety of forms.
Time series studies generally ﬁnd FDI levels to respond positively to avail-
able after-tax rates of return,13 and cross-sectional studies of the location
of outbound investment and the incentives facing diﬀerent investors report
consistently large eﬀects of taxes.14 There is additional evidence of the abil-
ity of parent companies to adjust the ﬁnancing of their foreign aﬃliates
and the transfer prices used in transactions between related parties in re-
sponse to tax diﬀerences, which may contribute to the appeal of locating
FDI in low-tax locations.15 While this evidence varies in quality and in
persuasiveness, taken as a whole it suggests that tax sparing is likely to in-
ﬂuence signiﬁcantly the location and experience of FDI.
2.3 Tax Sparing and Foreign Direct Investment
This section analyzes the eﬀect of tax sparing on incentives for host
governments to provide tax abatements, and nontax investment incentives,
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that, of the twenty OECD members with tax treaties with China, the United States is alone
in not granting tax sparing credits (Li 1995).
12. True to this prediction, subsequent diplomatic notes with several developing countries
(including China, India, and Thailand) bind the United States to provide tax sparing credits
for investments in those countries if it ever grants tax sparing for investments anywhere else.
13. See, e.g., Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon (1987), Young (1988),
Slemrod (1990), and Swenson (1994).
14. See Grubert and Mutti (1991), Harris (1993), Hines and Rice (1994), Hines (1996),
Devereux and Griﬃth (1998), and Desai and Hines (1999).
15. See Hines (1997, 1999) for interpretive surveys of this evidence and of the FDI liter-
ature.to foreign investors. This is followed by a review of the available data con-
cerning foreign direct investment by Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms.
2.3.1 Behavior of Host Governments
Tax sparing agreements encourage FDI if foreign investors receive spe-
cial tax abatements from host governments that would otherwise be oﬀset
by home-country taxes. For the same reason, host governments are consid-
erably more likely to oﬀer special tax abatements to foreign investors if
their home governments grant tax sparing. In turn, tax abatements reduce
the value of attracting additional FDI, and thereby make host govern-
ments somewhat less willing to provide nontax inducements for FDI. This
section analyzes a simple model that formalizes these notions.
Consider the behavior of a government that maximizes 	, deﬁned as
(1)   	 ≡+ −  ()    (, )    , BI QIG c G 

in which I denotes the level of inbound FDI and Q(I, G) is local proﬁtabil-
ity of that investment. Inbound FDI is taxed at rate 
,s o
Q(I, G)i st h e
local government’s tax revenue from FDI. B(I) denotes the nontax beneﬁts
of FDI to the local economy, measured in tax revenue equivalent units. G
is the level of public services provided by local governments to enhance a
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, and c is the per-unit cost of
providing such services.16
The level of foreign investment is a function of various country charac-
teristics and two variables under the government’s control: the tax rate, 
,
and the level of public services, G. Investment can be written as I(
*, G),
in which 
* is the combined host- and home-country eﬀective rate of proﬁt
taxation, itself a function of 
. The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing in-
terior solutions to the maximization of 	 over the choices of 
 and G are
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  *[ ( ) ] , =+ − − − 1
16. It is important that c is the net cost of providing public services to attract FDI. For
example, a government-provided road might simultaneously enhance the productivity of for-
eign capital and oﬀer valuable services to local travelers. In such a case, c is appropriately
calculated as the cost of the road net of the monetary beneﬁts of enhanced local travel (the
numeraire taken to be the value of tax revenue).
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h is the home-country tax rate and 
f is the foreign tax rate in the
absence of special abatements. The parameter  reﬂects the importance of
home-country taxation: 0i fﬁ r m sa r ee ﬀectively exempt from home-
country taxation (either because they have excess foreign tax credits or
because they have opportunities for costless and indeﬁnite deferral), while
1 if ﬁrms pay home-country taxes on any diﬀerences between domestic
and foreign tax rates. In a sample of U.S. multinational ﬁrms, the average
value of  is likely to be strictly bounded by 0 and 1. The parameter 
denotes tax sparing; 1 if the home country grants tax sparing, and








 * () , 11
which reﬂects that tax sparing is relevant only insofar as the home country
taxes foreign proﬁts.
Equation (5) illuminates the eﬀect of tax sparing on tax rate choices by
host governments, because taking tax sparing to be a continuous rather
than a discrete event, equation (5) implies that (∂2
*)/(∂
∂)  . Tax spar-
ing increases the sensitivity of total tax burdens to host-country tax rates.
This, in turn, implies that tax sparing is likely to encourage host countries
to oﬀer foreign investors special tax reductions. From equation (2), it is
clear that, absent a large eﬀect of tax sparing on investment (ignoring any
induced changes in 
), tax sparing must be associated with reduced home-
country tax rates. Consider, for example, the case in which a host govern-
ment does not oﬀer any special tax abatements and the home government
suddenly grants tax sparing. If 
 does not change, then tax sparing has no
eﬀect on I, because tax sparing credits are available only for special tax
reductions. But as long as 0, the introduction of tax sparing raises
the value of ∂
*/∂
, so if equation (2) characterizes the host government’s
taxation of foreign investors prior to the introduction of tax sparing, it
cannot continue to do so once the home government grants tax sparing—
unless 
 falls.
Tax-sparing induced lower rates of home-country taxation are likely to
be accompanied by reduced provision of government services valued by
foreign investors. Lower rates of 
 reduce the size of the bracketed term
on the left side of equation (3) and increase the size of the expression on
the right side of that equation, thereby implying that ∂I/∂G must rise in
response. Since, under normal circumstances, ∂I/∂G is a decreasing func-
tion of G, it follows that tax sparing is associated with lower levels of gov-
ernment spending. Tax sparing encourages host governments to reduce 
,
thereby lowering the value to host governments of any additional I trig-
gered by higher levels of G. Put diﬀerently, tax sparing encourages host
governments to substitute tax for nontax investment incentives.
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The model implies that tax sparing encourages FDI in two ways: by re-
ducing home-country taxation of foreign source income, and by encourag-
ing host governments to oﬀer special tax abatements to foreign investors.
Existing Japanese and U.S. data are suﬃcient (if just barely) to test the
investment and tax rate implications of the model. To a certain degree, the
investment incentives created by tax sparing agreements will be oﬀset by
a tendency to substitute tax for nontax methods of encouraging investment
by multinational ﬁrms based in countries granting tax sparing. However,
because the willingness of many capital-exporting countries to grant tax
sparing also encourages host countries to increase their default corporate
tax rates, there are likely to be large diﬀerences between the tax rates paid
by Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms, and signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their investment
patterns as a result.
The United Nations (1993) reports accumulated stocks of outbound
FDI by Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms. Stock ﬁgures are denominated in U.S.
dollars, and are distinguished by location for a large sample of countries.
Foreign direct investment stocks consist of accumulated debt and equity
investment from parent companies plus reinvested proﬁts of foreign aﬃl-
iates. Japanese and U.S. FDI stocks are book ﬁgures, which makes them
sensitive to inﬂation and therefore no better than proxies for market values
of FDI. Japanese and U.S. shares of total FDI stocks are, in principle,
comparable, but since the estimation sample excludes FDI in Japan and
the United States, mean values of Japanese and U.S. FDI will diﬀer in a
systematic way.17 Data on GDP are taken from the Summers-Heston data-
base (Summers and Heston 1991). Table 2.1 presents means and standard
deviations of variables used in the regressions.
Data on the foreign activities of U.S. ﬁrms are collected by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which per-
forms periodic benchmark surveys of the foreign operations of U.S. multi-
national corporations.18 U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) contains
income and balance sheet information for 1989 for foreign aﬃliates owned
at least 10 percent by U.S. parents. The BEA reports aggregate ﬁgures for
countries in which there is substantial U.S. investment; to protect the conﬁ-
dentiality of survey respondents, BEA suppresses information for coun-
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17. In 1990, 42 percent of the Japanese FDI stock was located in the United States, while
5 percent of the U.S. FDI stock was located in Japan. By omitting data on FDI in Japan
and the United States from the sample, the mean share of U.S. FDI is certain to exceed the
mean share of Japanese FDI.
18. American ﬁrms with foreign aﬃliates and assets exceeding $3 million are obliged to
respond to the BEA survey; BEA estimates that its survey respondents have 99.6 percent of
the foreign assets of U.S. ﬁrms. The regression variables are constructed from BEA data on
the activities of nonbank aﬃliates of nonbank parent ﬁrms. The BEA data are the basis of
FDI studies by Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), and Desai and Hines
(1999), from which some of the following descriptive material is drawn.tries in which one or two U.S. ﬁrms represent large fractions of total U.S.
investment.
The BEA reports amounts of paid-in aﬃliate equity, as well as the pretax
incomes and income tax payments of U.S. ﬁrms. It is therefore possible to
construct an average income tax rate that equals the ratio of income taxes
paid by local aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms to their local pretax incomes. Such a
calculation is based on aggregates, and may therefore overstate tax rates
by including information on aﬃliates with tax losses. Nevertheless, it is a
reliable indicator of the use of tax preferences such as special deductions,
depreciation rules, carryforwards and carrybacks, tax holidays, and non-
standard income concepts.
Data on the foreign business activities of Japanese ﬁrms come from an-
nual surveys conducted by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), which cover foreign operations in which parent ﬁrms
hold at least 10 percent ownership stakes. Firms are not obliged to respond
to these surveys, and while most do, the response rate is far from 100 per-
cent.19 Responses to the 1989 survey, tabulated in MITI (1991), constitute
the Japanese data used in the empirical work.
19. For example, in the 1991 survey, MITI sent questionnaires to 3,368 companies, of
which 1,789 responded. While Japanese ﬁrms with extensive foreign operations are perhaps
Table 2.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation N
A. FDI Sample (Tables 2.3, 2.5)
Japan FDI share minus U.S. FDI share 0.005269 0.023243 67
Tax sparing 0.22388 0.41999 67
ln(GDP) 18.0559 1.6787 67
Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 3.9464 7.7661 67
B. Tax Rate Sample (Table 2.7)
Japan tax rate minus U.S. tax rate 0.08548 0.22381 18
Tax sparing 0.44444 0.51131 18
ln(GDP) 19.7114 1.0179 18
Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 7.5464 9.7638 18
C. Equity Investment Sample (Tables 2.9, 2.10)
Japan equity share minus U.S. equity share 0.002896 0.021906 19
Tax sparing 0.42105 0.50726 19
ln(GDP) 19.6060 1.0907 19
Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 7.1492 9.6454 19
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions.
Foreign direct investment shares are ratios of FDI stocks in 1990 to total stocks of outbound
FDI by source countries. Tax rates are ratios of income taxes paid in 1989 to total pretax
income. Equity investment shares are ratios of stocks of paid-in equity in 1989 to total foreign
equity investment stocks of source countries. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals
1 if Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise.
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to preserve the conﬁdentiality of survey respondents, but it distinguishes
some items by location of aﬃliate and industry of parent company. The
MITI data include information on the paid-in equity of parent Japanese
ﬁrms, the “ordinary income” of aﬃliates, and aﬃliates’ after-tax proﬁts.
The Japanese translation of “paid-in equity” is “capital stock,” but this
balance sheet entry excludes retained earnings and is therefore comparable
to the American notion of paid-in equity.
“Ordinary income” is a Japanese accounting concept that equals the
diﬀerence between income items (such as net sales revenue and capital
income) and expense items (including interest charges and depreciation).
“After-tax proﬁts” equal “ordinary income” plus net extraordinary gains,
plus net disposition of special reserves, minus corporate taxes. It is pos-
sible, therefore, to use the diﬀerence between ordinary income and after-
tax proﬁts as an indicator of the corporate tax burden facing Japanese
aﬃliates, though this entails ignoring the (typically small) diﬀerences in-
troduced by extraordinary gains and the disposition of special reserves.20
More likely to be problematic are systematic diﬀerences between Japanese
and U.S. accounting conventions, making levels of Japanese and U.S. tax
burdens (thereby calculated) not exactly comparable. Consequently, the
empirical work focuses on diﬀerences between average tax rates paid by
Japanese ﬁrms in countries with whom Japan does and does not have tax
sparing agreements, contrasting these with diﬀerences in tax rates paid by
U.S. ﬁrms.
2.4 Evidence from U.S. and Japanese Firms
This section evaluates evidence of the impact of tax sparing agreements
appearing in diﬀerences between the location and performance of foreign
investment by U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms.
2.4.1 FDI in a Large Cross Section
Japanese investors exhibit a pronounced tendency to locate FDI in
countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements. Table 2.2 presents
a simple comparison of Japanese and U.S. investment patterns. Of the
sixty-seven receiving countries for whom FDI data are available, Japan
has tax sparing agreements with fourteen. The Japanese share of FDI lo-
cated in a country is deﬁned to be (FDIi/FDItot), in which FDIi is the stock
more likely than others to respond to the MITI questionnaire, there is no way of verifying
this directly.
20. The calculations constrain tax rates facing Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms to lie between 0
and 100 percent. Calculated tax rates omit consideration of taxes other than income taxes,
since ﬁrms are eligible to claim foreign tax credits only for income taxes paid to foreign gov-
ernments.
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Japanese FDI located in all countries in 1990. American FDI shares for
1990 are deﬁned analogously. The median Japanese FDI share in the four-
teen countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements is 0.60 per-
cent and the mean Japanese FDI share is 0.94 percent, both of which
exceed the median (0.36 percent) and mean (0.72 percent) U.S. FDI shares
in the same countries.
It is useful to conﬁrm that these diﬀerences are not merely functions of
Japanese and U.S. investment patterns in countries excluded from the
sample (particularly the United States and Japan), so the second row of
table 2.2 presents investment share information for the ﬁfty-three sample
countries with whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements. Invest-
ment patterns in these countries diﬀer markedly from those with whom
Japan has tax sparing agreements. The median Japanese FDI share in this
subsample is 0.02 percent and the mean share is 0.64 percent, while the
U.S. FDI share has a median of 0.12 percent and a mean of 1.38 percent.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the comparison between Japanese and U.S. invest-
ment patterns. The black bars in the ﬁgure represent mean shares of Japa-
nese investment, and the white bars mean shares of U.S. investment. The
two bars on the left describe investment shares in countries with whom
Japan does not have tax sparing agreements, whereas the two bars on the
right describe investment shares in countries with whom Japan does have
tax sparing agreements.
These diﬀerences can be compared in a straightforward way in a regres-
sion context. The ﬁrst column of table 2.3 presents estimated coeﬃcients
from regressing diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. FDI shares in each
of the sample countries on a constant term and a dummy variable that
Table 2.2 FDI Shares
Japan United States
Tax sparing (N  14)
Median (%) 0.601 0.358
Mean 0.942 0.715
Standard deviation 1.06 0.988
No tax sparing (N  53)
Median (%) 0.0219 0.124
Mean 0.604 1.38
Standard deviation 1.54 3.29
Note: The table presents medians, means, and standard deviations of Japanese and U.S. FDI
shares in two groups of countries in 1990: those with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements
(fourteen countries), and those with whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements (ﬁfty-
three countries). Entries are percentages. Foreign direct investment shares are ratios of FDI
stocks in 1990 to total stocks of outbound FDI by source countries. Median FDI shares are
observations with median values in each cell.
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Dependent Variable:
Japanese FDI Share Minus U.S. FDI Share
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.007445 0.097620 0.097485
(0.003538) (0.037801) (0.037076)




Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 0.0009296
(0.0003494)
R2 0.031 0.196 0.201
N 67 67 67
Note: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between Japanese and U.S. shares of their
respective total FDI stocks in 1990. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise. The table presents estimated coeﬃcients from OLS
regressions; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Fig. 2.1 Tax sparing and FDI
Note: The ﬁgure presents mean FDI shares of U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms. Foreign direct invest-
ment shares are ratios of FDI stocks in 1990 to total stocks of outbound FDI by source
countries. White bars depict average FDI shares of U.S. ﬁrms, and black bars depict average
FDI shares of Japanese ﬁrms. The two bars on the left describe FDI shares in countries with
whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements, whereas the two bars on the right de-
scribe FDI shares in countries with whom Japan does have tax sparing agreements.equals 1 if Japan has a tax sparing agreement, and equals 0 otherwise.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable, 0.0097, indicates that
diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. FDI shares are roughly 1 percent
higher in countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements than they
are in other countries. The regression reported in column (2) of table 2.3
indicates that the eﬀect of tax sparing on Japanese U.S. FDI share diﬀer-
ences rises with the inclusion of ln(GDP) as an explanatory variable, the
estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable implying that Japanese FDI
shares are roughly 1.7 percent higher in countries with whom Japan has
tax sparing agreements. The third column of table 2.3 reports the results
of a regression speciﬁcation in which the tax sparing dummy variable is
interacted with ln(GDP); again, tax sparing is associated in a signiﬁcant
way with higher FDI levels. Evaluated at the mean of ln(GDP), the co-
eﬃcient implies that tax sparing agreements coincide with 1.7 percent
higher Japanese FDI shares. Since the Japanese FDI share has a sample
mean of 0.71 percent, eﬀects in the range of 0.97–1.7 percent correspond
to FDI that is 1.4–2.4 times greater than what it would have been in the
absence of tax sparing.
Japan does not grant tax sparing on a random basis, thereby raising
the possibility that the observed correlation between FDI and tax sparing
reﬂects the inﬂuence of variables omitted from the FDI equation. Coun-
tries with whom Japan has close economic or cultural ties are likely to
receive unusually large fractions of Japanese FDI and might also be coun-
tries with whom Japan is inclined to conclude tax sparing agreements.
Given the arbitrariness of most methods of identifying the closeness of
bilateral relations with Japan, it can be diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀect of
tax sparing on Japanese FDI from the eﬀect of other connections that are
correlated with the presence of tax sparing agreements.
An alternative method is to use tax sparing agreements between the
United Kingdom and various developing countries as instruments for tax
sparing agreements that involve Japan. The United Kingdom is a major
capital exporter, has a tax system that resembles Japan’s, and is similarly
inclined to include tax sparing provisions in its bilateral treaties with devel-
oping countries. The advantage of using U.K. tax sparing provisions as
proxies for Japanese provisions is that the United Kingdom has economic
and cultural ties that diﬀer from Japan’s, and U.K. tax treaty patterns are
therefore less likely to be inﬂuenced by important variables that are omit-
ted from the Japanese FDI equation. Table 2.4 presents information on
the countries with whom Japan and the United Kingdom had tax sparing
arrangements as of 1990. Both countries exhibit a tendency to oﬀer tax
sparing for investments in major developing countries, but there are some
diﬀerences between their country coverages.
Table 2.5 presents instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the FDI
equations reported in table 2.2, with a 0–1 dummy variable indicating the
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United United
Country Japan Kingdom Country Japan Kingdom
Argentina No Noa Malaysiab SP SP
Australiab No No Mauritania No No
Austria No No Mauritius No SP
Bangladesh SP SP Mexicob Noa Noa
Bolivia No No Morocco No SP
Brazilb SP No Netherlandsb No No
Cameroon No No New Zealandc No No
Canadab No No Nigeria No SP
Chile No No Norway No No
Chinab SP SP Pakistan SP SP
Colombia No No Panama No No
Costa Rica No No Papua New Guinea No SP
Cyprus No SP Paraguay No No
Denmark No No Peru No No
Dominican Republic No No Philippinesb SP No
Ecuador No No Poland No No
Egypt No SP Portugal No SP
Finland No No Senegal No No
Franceb No No Singaporeb SP SP
Gabon No No South Africa No No
West Germanyb No No Spainb SP SP
Ghana No SP Sri Lanka SP SP
Greece No No Sweden No No
Guyana No Noa Switzerlandb No No
Hong Kongb No n.a. Thailand SP SP
India SP SP Trinidad & Tobago No SP
Indonesiab SP SP Tunisia No SP
Iran No No Turkey Noa SP
Ireland SP No United Kingdomb No n.a.
Israel No SP Uruguay No No
Italyb No No Venezuela No Noa
Jamaica No SP Zambia SP SP
Kenya No SP Zimbabwe No No
Korea, Republic of b SP SP
Note: The table consists of the sixty-seven countries for whom FDI and GDP data are available for
1990. Entries in the ﬁrst column indicate whether Japan grants tax sparing in 1990, and in the second
column, whether the United Kingdom does so. SP  tax sparing; No  no tax sparing; n.a.  not
applicable (governments do not have treaties with themselves).
aDenotes countries with tax sparing agreements subsequent to 1990.
bDenotes observations included in the eighteen- and nineteen-country samples analyzed in tables 2.6–
2.10.
cDenotes the observation (New Zealand) included in the nineteen-country sample analyzed in tables
2.9 and 2.10.presence of a U.K. tax sparing agreement serving as an instrument for
Japanese tax sparing agreements. (The ﬁrst stage equations of these IV
estimates are speciﬁed as linear probability models.) The results are some-
what more dramatic than those reported in Table 2.3: the estimated eﬀect
of Japanese tax sparing remains signiﬁcant, and is now on the order of 3
percent diﬀerences in FDI shares.
2.4.2 Tax Sparing and Tax Rates
The model analyzed and described in section 2.3 implies that foreign
investors are likely to receive ﬁscal inducements in the form of reduced
taxes in situations in which home countries grant tax sparing credits. This
section compares the experiences of Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms in order to
test this implication of the model.
Table 2.6 distinguishes the average tax rates faced by Japanese and U.S.
ﬁrms in sample countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements
and those with whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements. Aggre-
gate tax burdens are quite consistent with the model’s implications. In the
seven countries in the sample with whom Japan has tax sparing agree-
ments, Japanese ﬁrms face average tax rates of 28 percent, as compared
with 32 percent for U.S. ﬁrms. Sample medians diﬀer more widely: The
average Japanese tax rate in the median country is 23 percent, while the
average U.S. tax rate in the median country is 39 percent.
Comparison of the average foreign tax burdens of U.S. and Japanese
ﬁrms can be highly problematic due both to diﬀerences in their tax treat-
Table 2.5 FDI Shares and Tax Sparing, IV Speciﬁcation
Dependent Variable:
Japanese FDI Share Minus U.S. FDI Share
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.012186 0.112725 0.116498
(0.005503) (0.040895) (0.041754)




Tax sparing  ln(GDP) (0.0018653
(0.0007268)
N 67 67 67
Note: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between Japanese and U.S. shares of their
respective total FDI stocks in 1990. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise. The table presents estimated coeﬃcients from
instrumental variables regressions in which U.K. tax sparing agreements are used as instru-
ments for Japanese tax sparing agreements. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
in parentheses.
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ventions. The most useful way to frame the tax rate information reported
in the ﬁrst row of table 2.6 is to contrast it with evidence of average tax
rates faced by U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms in other countries. The second row
of table 2.6 reports this information, which suggests that, in countries with
whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements, Japanese ﬁrms report
signiﬁcantly higher average tax rates than do U.S. ﬁrms. The average for-
eign tax rate faced by Japanese ﬁrms in sample countries with whom Japan
does not have a tax sparing agreement is 48 percent, while the correspond-
ing average tax rate faced by U.S. ﬁrms is 29 percent. Median tax rates
are 53 percent and 36 percent, respectively. These data suggest that some
combination of national accounting practices, diﬀerences in the ways that
foreign aﬃliates are ﬁnanced, and other business practices that enable
ﬁrms to avoid local taxes, tend to elevate the calculated tax rates faced by
Japanese ﬁrms compared to their American counterparts. These diﬀer-
ences make more striking the evidence of lower tax rates faced by Japanese
ﬁrms in countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements.
Figure 2.2 presents these diﬀerences graphically. The black bars in the
ﬁgure represent average tax rates paid by Japanese ﬁrms, and the white
bars average tax rates paid by U.S. ﬁrms. The two left-most bars describe
tax rates in countries with whom Japan does not have tax sparing agree-
ments, whereas the two right-most bars describe tax rates in countries with
whom Japan does have tax sparing agreements.
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the eﬀect of tax sparing on average tax
rate diﬀerences. The OLS estimates in column (1) conﬁrm that the diﬀer-
ences apparent in table 2.6 are statistically signiﬁcant: A tax sparing
agreement with Japan is associated with Japanese tax rates that are 23
percent lower than those faced by U.S. ﬁrms. Although the small sample
Table 2.6 Tax Rates
Japan United States
Tax sparing (N  7)
Median (%) 22.5 38.5
Mean 27.7 32.2
Standard deviation 2.02 18.9
No tax sparing (N  11)
Median (%) 52.6 35.8
Mean 48.3 29.4
Standard deviation 26.5 12.2
Note: The table presents medians, means, and standard deviations of Japanese and U.S. aver-
age tax rates in two groups of countries in 1989: those with whom Japan has tax sparing
agreements (seven countries), and those with whom Japan does not have tax sparing
agreements (eleven countries). Entries are percentages. Tax rates are ratios of income taxes
paid in 1989 to total pretax income. Median tax rates are observations with median values
in each cell.
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Fig. 2.2 Average tax rates
Note: The ﬁgure presents average tax rates paid by U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms. Tax rates are
ratios of income taxes paid in 1989 to total pretax income. White bars depict average tax
rates paid by U.S. ﬁrms, and black bars depict average tax rates paid by Japanese ﬁrms. The
two bars on the left describe tax rates in countries with whom Japan does not have tax
sparing agreements, whereas the two bars on the right describe tax rates in countries with
whom Japan does have tax sparing agreements.
Table 2.7 Tax Rates and Tax Sparing
Dependent Variable:
Japanese Tax Rate Minus U.S. Tax Rate
OLS OLS IV IV
Constant 0.18962 0.43658 0.14474 0.71477
0.05954 (0.86044) (0.07305) (0.73381)
Tax sparing 0.23430 0.22076 0.13332 0.11314




N 18 18 18 18
Note: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between host-country tax rates facing Japa-
nese and U.S. ﬁrms in 1989. Tax rates are ratios of income taxes paid in 1989 to total pre-
tax income. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Japan grants tax sparing and
0 otherwise. The ﬁrst two columns present estimated coeﬃcients from OLS regressions.
The third and fourth columns present estimated coeﬃcients from IV regressions in which
U.K. tax sparing agreements are used as instruments for Japanese tax sparing agreements.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
size (only eighteen observations) is unfortunate, it is worth bearing in mind
that these eighteen countries receive 66 percent of Japanese FDI not
bound for the United States. Inclusion of GDP as a regressor changes the
results very little, as the results reported in column (2) indicate. Using
the existence of a tax sparing agreement with the United Kingdom as aninstrument for Japanese tax sparing reduces both the size and the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the estimated eﬀect of tax sparing, as indicated by
the instrumental variables (IV) results reported in columns (3) and (4).
Though the estimates continue to imply a large (13 percent) eﬀect of tax
sparing on tax rate diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms, this dif-
ference is no longer signiﬁcant in the IV regressions. At least in part, this
is the product of using an IV procedure on such a small sample.
2.4.3 Tax Sparing and Equity Investments
From the evidence reported in section 2.4.1 it is clear that Japanese
ﬁrms are more inclined than are U.S. ﬁrms to locate FDI in countries with
whom Japan has tax sparing agreements. Foreign direct investment equals
equity and debt ﬂows from parent ﬁrms plus the reinvested proﬁts of local
aﬃliates. Tax sparing agreements will, therefore, encourage Japanese FDI
even if the agreements aﬀect only the reinvested proﬁts of Japanese aﬃli-
ates. Suppose that aﬃliates routinely reinvest a certain fraction of their
after-tax proﬁts; if tax sparing agreements prompt host governments to
reduce local taxes, then aﬃliates’ after-tax proﬁts will rise and so will the
retained earnings component of FDI. Consequently, the observed correla-
tion between tax sparing agreements and FDI does not necessarily imply
that tax sparing encourages equity investments. Because the determinants
of equity capital ﬂows are of independent interest, and because host coun-
tries are understandably eager to attract such ﬂows, it is useful to consider
the determinants of U.S.-Japanese diﬀerences in equity investments. In ad-
dition, the equity data come in a disaggregated form that distinguishes
investments by industry of aﬃliate. As with the tax rate information, how-
ever, the data are available for only a rather small sample of countries.
Table 2.8 presents data on U.S. and Japanese shares of equity capital
located in the nineteen sample countries for which such data are available.
Table 2.8 Equity Investment Shares
Japan United States
Tax sparing (N  7)
Median (%) 2.65 0.401
Mean 2.55 0.978
Standard deviation 1.27 1.32
No tax sparing (N  12)
Median (%) 0.743 2.48
Mean 1.50 3.14
Standard deviation 1.54 2.70
Note: The table presents medians, means, and standard deviations of Japanese and U.S.
shares of equity investment in two groups of countries in 1989: those with whom Japan has
tax sparing agreements (seven countries), and those with whom Japan does not have tax
sparing agreements (twelve countries). Entries are percentages. Equity investment shares are
ratios of stocks of paid-in equity in 1989 to total foreign equity investment stocks of source
countries. Median investment shares are observations with median values in each cell.
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cate an average of 2.6 percent of their foreign equity in the seven sample
countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements, and 1.5 percent
in the twelve countries without Japanese tax sparing agreements. By com-
parison, U.S. ﬁrms locate an average of 1 percent of their foreign equity
in tax sparing countries and 3.1 percent in those with whom Japan does
not have tax sparing agreements. Similarly signed and somewhat more dra-
matic diﬀerences appear between median equity investments of Japanese
and U.S. ﬁrms. Figure 2.3 depicts the mean equity investment shares of
Japanese (black bars) and U.S. (white bars) ﬁrms in countries with and
without Japanese tax sparing agreements.
Table 2.9 analyzes these data in a regression context. In the regression
reported in column (1), tax sparing is associated with a 3.2 percent diﬀer-
ence between Japanese and U.S. shares of investment in the form of equity
capital. The estimated eﬀect of tax sparing is 3.1 percent when ln(GDP)
is included as a regressor (as reported in column [2]), as it is when tax spar-
ing is interacted with ln(GDP) (as reported in column [3]), and its eﬀect
evaluated at the mean value of ln(GDP). Evaluated at the mean Jap-
21. The sample is restricted to manufacturing industries in order to enhance the compara-
bility of ﬁgures for Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms and to increase the available sample size. The
results reported in tables 2.8–2.10 are very similar to those obtained using data on ﬁrms in
all industries.
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Fig. 2.3 Tax sparing and equity investment
Note: The ﬁgure presents mean equity investment shares of U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms in manu-
facturing industries. Equity investment shares are ratios of stocks of paid-in equity in 1989
to total foreign equity investment stocks of source countries. White bars depict average equity
investment shares of U.S. ﬁrms, and black bars depict average equity investment shares of
Japanese ﬁrms. The two bars on the left describe equity investment shares in countries with
whom Japan does not have tax sparing agreements, whereas the two bars on the right de-
scribe equity investment shares in countries with whom Japan does have tax sparing agree-
ments.anese equity investment share of 1.9 percent, a 3.1 percent diﬀerence im-
plies that tax sparing is associated with Japanese equity investments that
are 1.6 times greater than they would have been in the absence of tax
sparing.
Table 2.10 presents the results of IV regressions in which tax sparing
agreements with the United Kingdom serve as instruments for Japanese
tax sparing agreements. The results are quite similar to those reported in
table 2.9, with the diﬀerence that the estimated eﬀect of tax sparing on
equityinvestment rises(e.g.,to 4.1percentin theregressionreported incol-
umn [1]), and the estimated standard errors are somewhat larger as well.
Industry-level data on Japanese and U.S. equity investments are, in prin-
ciple, available for numerous two-digit industries, but various omissions
make it impossible to obtain even modest sample sizes for any but six
manufacturing industries. The six two-digit industries for which it is pos-
sible to make meaningful comparisons of Japanese and U.S. equity invest-
ment shares are food products, chemicals, metal products, nonelectrical
machinery, electric and electronic equipment, and transportation equip-
ment. Table 2.11 presents results of six regressions in which diﬀerences
between Japanese and U.S. equity investment shares are regressed on con-
stantsandadummyvariableindicatingthepresenceofaJapanesetaxspar-
ing agreement. All of the estimated coeﬃcients on the tax sparing dummy
variable are positive; in three cases (chemicals, metal products, and electric
and electronic equipment), they are signiﬁcant at the 95 percent conﬁdence
level, and in two others (food products and transportation equipment), at
the 90 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 2.9 Equity Investment Shares and Tax Sparing
Dependent Variable: Japanese Equity Investment Share
Minus U.S. Equity Investment Share
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.016399 0.108494 0.115843
(0.004706) (0.047536) (0.044455)




Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 0.001534
(0.000368)
R2 0.551 0.650 0.606
N 19 19 19
Note: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between Japanese and U.S. equity investment
shares in manufacturing industries in 1989. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals
1 if Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise. The table presents estimated coeﬃcients from
OLS regressions; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Dependent Variable: Japanese Equity Investment Share
Minus U.S. Equity Investment Share
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.019994 0.096699 0.091997
(0.005629) (0.059393) (0.078644)




Tax sparing  ln(GDP) 0.0025648
(0.0007048)
N 19 19 19
Note: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between Japanese and U.S. equity investment
shares in manufacturing industries in 1989. “Tax sparing” is a dummy variable that equals
1 if Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise. The table presents estimated coeﬃcients from
instrumental variables regressions in which U.K. tax sparing agreements are used as instru-
ments for Japanese tax sparing agreements. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
in parentheses.
Table 2.11 Tax Sparing and Equity Investment by Industry
Dependent Variable: Japanese Equity Investment Share
Minus U.S. Equity Investment Share
Industry Constant Tax Sparing R2 N
Food products 0.046152 0.060704 0.337 10
(0.021636) (0.027808)
Chemicals 0.027949 0.059861 0.577 15
(0.009784) (0.014118)
Metal products 0.028922 0.071336 0.337 14
(0.015063) (0.029844)
Nonelectric machinery 0.008548 0.002025 0.002 11
(0.009247) (0.010235)
Electric equipment 0.035529 0.049279 0.739 8
(0.009245) (0.011971)
Transportation equipment 0.000949 0.018457 0.224 11
(0.007879) (0.010084)
Note: The dependent variables are diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. equity investment
shares in each of the six indicated two-digit manufacturing industries in 1989. “Tax Sparing”
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise. The table
presents estimated coeﬃcients from OLS regressions; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are in parentheses.While these results are, of course, consistent with all of the other avail-
able evidence of the eﬀect of tax sparing on investment, the very small
sample sizes make their interpretation for any particular industry quite
diﬃcult. What the results reported in table 2.11 do is to clarify that the
tax sparing evidence available from aggregate data do not reﬂect obvious
industrial diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. investment patterns.
Table 2.12 presents the results of industry-level regressions in which U.K.
tax sparing agreements are used as instruments for Japanese tax sparing
agreements. The estimated eﬀects of tax sparing on equity investment are
very similar to those reported in table 2.11.
2.4.4 Implications
The regression results indicate that tax sparing agreements have sizable
eﬀects on the location and volume of FDI, and on the tax rates faced by
foreign investors. These two eﬀects are of course related, since host-
country tax reductions encourage FDI, and host governments grant tax
abatements in anticipation of attracting additional FDI. Estimates avail-
able in the literature (e.g., Hines and Rice 1994) suggest that tax rate re-
ductions of 23 percent should stimulate roughly 80 percent greater FDI;
but these estimates are based on the behavior of U.S. ﬁrms that are not
entitled to claim tax sparing credits for host-country tax reductions. Tax
Table 2.12 Tax Sparing and Equity Investment by Industry, IV Speciﬁcation
Dependent Variable:
Japanese Equity Investment Share
Minus U.S. Equity Investment Share
Industry Constant Tax Sparing N
Food products 0.043827 0.054889 10
(0.024629) (0.048381)
Chemicals 0.028804 0.061465 15
(0.011315) (0.019402)
Metal products 0.021615 0.045763 14
(0.018839) (0.023065)
Nonelectric machinery 0.008548 0.002025 11
(0.009247) (0.010235)
Electric equipment 0.035529 0.049279 8
(0.009245) (0.011971)
Transportation equipment 0.002761 0.023440 11
(0.008232) (0.011714)
Note: The dependent variables are diﬀerences between Japanese and U.S. equity invest-
ment shares in each of the six indicated two-digit manufacturing industries in 1989. “Tax
Sparing” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Japan grants tax sparing and 0 otherwise.
The table presents estimated coeﬃcients from instrumental variables regressions in which
U.K. tax sparing agreements are used as instruments for Japanese tax sparing agreements.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries 63sparing increases, possibly manyfold, the sensitivity of FDI to host-
country taxes. Consequently, the ﬁnding that tax sparing is associated with
140–240 percent greater FDI, or roughly double the eﬀect that would have
been predicted on the basis of tax rate diﬀerences and in the absence of
tax sparing credits, is quite consistent with the earlier literature.
2.5 Conclusion
Most high-income capital-exporting countries, including Japan, provide
tax sparing for investments in developing countries. The United States
steadfastly refuses to do so, and Japanese and U.S. FDI experiences diﬀer
as a consequence. Japanese ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely than U.S.
ﬁrms to concentrate their outbound FDI, and its equity component, in
countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements. Host-government
policies are also aﬀected: Japanese ﬁrms are taxed at lower rates than are
U.S. ﬁrms in countries with whom Japan has tax sparing agreements.
These diﬀerences persist when tax sparing agreements with the United
Kingdom are used as instruments for Japanese tax sparing agreements.
The argument that tax sparing is unlikely to inﬂuence FDI patterns is
inconsistent with this evidence and with a larger literature that documents
the eﬀect of taxation on the activities of multinational ﬁrms. There is a
more basic question, which this paper does not directly address, of the
desirability of encouraging FDI in this way. In order to answer this ques-
tion, it is necessary to evaluate not only the likely eﬀects of tax sparing on
levels of FDI and the policies of host governments, but also the eﬀects of
tax sparing on tax compliance and tax complexity, its impact on ongoing
treaty negotiations, the eﬀect of outbound FDI on domestic economic per-
formance, and the desirability of enacting major tax provisions through
treaties rather than tax legislation. For more than forty years, the U.S.
Senate has held that these considerations (and possibly others) imply that
it is not in the interest of the United States to grant tax sparing in any of
its treaties. In practice, this position appears to be partly responsible for
the relatively modest levels of American investment in developing coun-
tries.
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Comment Timothy J. Goodspeed
Developing countries need to attract capital to grow. The importance of
evaluating how developing countries can attract long-term foreign capital
has always been important, but the question has become particularly rel-
evant in light of the recent rapid outﬂows of short-term capital and the
resulting volatility in capital markets in countries such as Mexico and
South Korea. As we have witnessed, turmoil in global capital markets
Timothy J. Goodspeed is associate professor of economics at Hunter College and the City
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66 James R. Hines Jr.aﬀects the welfare of both developed and developing countries. Tax spar-
ing is one ﬁscal tool that developed countries have at their disposal to help
developing countries attract capital.
Developing countries consider a tax sparing provision to be an impor-
tant element of tax treaties with developed country treaty partners that
practice worldwide taxation and give a foreign tax credit. For, without a
tax sparing provision, a developing country that tries to attract foreign
investment by oﬀering a reduced tax rate for a period of time (a tax holi-
day) will ﬁnd that its policy is ineﬀective and simply transfers tax revenue
to the developed country treaty partner. This is because a multinational
based in the developed country that repatriates (or is deemed to repatriate)
income from a subsidiary in the developing country (and that ﬁnds itself
in a deﬁcit foreign tax credit position) will owe tax to the developed coun-
try in the amount of the diﬀerence between the (reduced) taxes paid to the
developing country and the taxes that would have been owed to the devel-
oped country had the income been earned there. Under a tax sparing pro-
vision, credit is normally calculated at the higher statutory rate rather than
at the reduced rate of the tax holiday. The multinational is, in eﬀect, given
credit for taxes it did not actually pay, thereby preserving the intended
incentive of the tax holiday.
The paper by James R. Hines Jr. addresses whether tax sparing is eﬀec-
tive in attracting capital to developing countries. As readers of the litera-
ture in international taxation have come to expect from the author, he
once again brings clever and impressive economic analysis to bear on an
important but neglected aspect of international taxation. For U.S. policy
makers, his empirical results may be surprising and somewhat discon-
certing. As he indicates, the United States has historically refused to ap-
prove tax treaties that contain tax sparing provisions. While this is partly
due to general tax principles, it also derives from the perception that tax
sparing is ineﬀective in helping developing countries attract capital. If tax
sparing is ineﬀective in stimulating new investment, it may simply provide
a windfall to old capital. Hines ﬁnds that this perception is incorrect; he
ﬁnds that tax sparing is eﬀective in stimulating investment, including new
equity investment, in developing countries. The study constitutes an im-
portant advance in our understanding of the eﬀect of tax sparing on invest-
ment activities.
Hines goes about his task by comparing outbound investment patterns
and foreign average tax rates of companies based in two countries, Japan
and the United States, that both use a foreign tax credit system. Japan
tends to grant tax sparing to developing countries while the United States
does not. The evidence is presented in three parts. First, Hines examines
whether the share of Japanese FDI in country. A relative to the share of
U.S. FDI in country A depends on whether country A has a tax sparing
agreement with Japan. Second, he examines whether the average tax rate
Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries 67faced by Japanese companies investing in country A relative to the average
tax rate faced by American companies investing in country A depends on
whether Japan has a tax sparing agreement with country A. Third, Hines
tries to ascertain whether investment that is induced by tax sparing
agreements is new equity investment or simply higher after-tax earnings
resulting from, for instance, a tax holiday, that is reinvested.
The ﬁrst part of the evidence presented uses United Nations data on
FDI by Japanese and U.S. multinationals in sixty-seven countries. A
dummy variable is used to indicate whether a country has a tax sparing
agreement with Japan; Hines ﬁnds that the existence of a tax sparing
agreement (controlling for GDP diﬀerences) has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the share of Japanese relative to U.S. investment. The second and
third parts of the evidence presented use data on investment activities of
Japanese multinationals published by the Japanese Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) to construct average tax rates and mea-
sure new equity investment of Japanese multinationals in eighteen coun-
tries. Corresponding variables for U.S. multinationals are constructed from
data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Hines ﬁnds
that tax sparing is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with the diﬀer-
ence between Japanese and U.S. tax rates in a country. He also ﬁnds that
tax sparing is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the diﬀerence between
Japanese and U.S. equity investment shares. It is easy to criticize the re-
gressions that use the MITI data for the small number of observations,
but one must recognize that obtaining the Japanese data at all (and under-
standing Japanese accounting, not to mention the linguistic interpretations
of accounting concepts) is a diﬃcult problem that the author had to over-
come. The use of this untapped data constitutes a valuable addition to
our knowledge.
The biggest problem that Hines faces (and he recognizes this) is that
there are many factors besides tax sparing that inﬂuence the diﬀerence
in investment shares of U.S. and Japanese companies. In analyzing trade
patterns, it is particularly important to note the proximity and historical
ties of trading partners. What this means in the case of U.S. versus Japa-
nese investment patterns is that one is likely to ﬁnd a greater share of
Japanese investment going to Asian trading partners. As it happens, many
Japanese tax sparing agreements are with countries in Asia. The problem,
then, is that one may ﬁnd a positive correlation between countries with tax
sparing agreements with Japan and Japan’s share of investment relative to
the U.S. share that is due to natural trading patterns rather than to tax
sparing agreements.
This applies equally to the results on tax rates. Tax sparing can lead to
lower tax rates for Japanese companies either directly or because of tax
competition among similar countries. One possible reason for observing
lower Japanese tax rates in the tax sparing countries is that these countries
68 James R. Hines Jr.are in competition with other Asian countries. Again, since Japanese tax
sparing agreements tend to be with Asian countries, it is not easy to sepa-
rate out the eﬀect that results from tax sparing and the eﬀect that results
from tax competition among Asian countries for Japanese investment.
One natural correction for this is to include a dummy variable for Asian
countries, possibly augmented by more sophisticated spatial econometric
techniques. This is diﬃcult, however, because few non-Asian countries in
Hines’s sample have a tax sparing agreement with Japan. (The countries
in this category are Brazil and Spain in the small sample; the UN data add
Zambia and Ireland to the list.) Hines comes up with a clever alternative.
He attempts to circumvent the problem by using the countries with which
the United Kingdom has a tax sparing agreement as an instrument for a
country that has a tax sparing agreement with Japan. The United King-
dom tends to have tax sparing agreements with most of the countries with
Japanese tax sparing agreements (Ireland being one notable exception),
and in addition, the United Kingdom has tax sparing agreements with sev-
eral other African, Caribbean, and European countries. The instrumental
variable approach tends to support the conclusion that tax sparing agree-
ments are associated with higher Japanese relative to American shares of
FDI.
A second factor apart from tax sparing that might inﬂuence the diﬀer-
ence in investment shares of U.S. and Japanese companies is diﬀerent laws
in the two countries. For instance, although both the United States and
Japan calculate the foreign tax credit on a worldwide basis (as Hines points
out), the way in which the credit is calculated diﬀers. The United States
calculates its foreign tax credit limit using “baskets” to try to divide highly
taxed and lowly taxed income. Japan, on the other hand, does not, and
uses some other rules (described in Ault 1997) to try to limit averaging of
foreign taxes. If it is easier for Japanese companies to average foreign taxes,
there could be a greater incentive for Japanese companies to generate in-
come in a low-tax country, thereby oﬀsetting taxes paid in a high-tax coun-
try. This could lead to a high response of investment from tax sparing by
Japan that would not be replicated by a U.S. tax sparing agreement. The
tax sparing dummy could be partially picking up the diﬀerence between
laws in the United States and those in Japan.
A third factor that might be inﬂuencing investment patterns are public
good levels. Hines includes public expenditures as well as taxes in his theo-
retical model, and his inclusion of GDP as an explanatory factor may
partly proxy for general demand for public goods. However, some disag-
gregation of demand for public goods may be called for if some countries
provide more in the way of public goods that are valued by businesses. To
the extent that U.S. and Japanese investment patterns are similar across
industries, this should not matter much, because any bias introduced will
be the same for both countries. However, it could matter if one country’s
Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries 69FDI is skewed more toward industries that use public goods valued more
intensively by businesses.
Finally, I would like to bring up some issues not directly addressed in
the study that are important in determining whether tax sparing is desir-
able. First, there are many methods of encouraging capital accumulation
and growth in developing countries. Tax sparing is but one method, and
its advantages and disadvantages should be compared to those of other
methods of encouraging investment. For example, what are the advantages
and disadvantages of using tax sparing rather than direct aid to encourage
investment? One problem with tax sparing is that it provides an incentive
for a proﬁtable company only. New start-up ventures that anticipate initial
losses will have little additional incentive because there is no advantage
for those who have no tax liability. Another problem with tax sparing is
that it may encourage transfer pricing abuses. Hines reports that Japanese
companies tend to report tax rates that are higher than for American com-
panies in countries without a tax sparing agreement. Yet the data of Gru-
bert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1993) (GGS) indicate low rates of return
(taxable income divided by assets) earned by Japanese companies in the
United States. This raises the possibility that Japanese companies could
be using transfer prices to funnel income earned in the United States
through tax sparing countries. Since GGS ﬁnd that at least half of the low
taxes paid by Japanese companies in the United States can be explained
by reasons other than transfer pricing, such pricing strategies may not be
overly abusive; nevertheless, transfer pricing problems need to be evalu-
ated in judging the eﬃcacy of tax sparing. Direct aid avoids the possible
transfer pricing problems of tax sparing, but has problems of its own, such
as the need to set up a bureaucracy to administer grants and the lack of
private market determination of which projects are ﬁnanced.
A second issue that is important to understand that is not addressed in
Hines’s study is how tax sparing aﬀects the timing of repatriation deci-
sions. Suppose developing country A decides to oﬀer a tax holiday; further
suppose that the United States, for instance, changes its tax treaty with
country A to allow tax sparing. Without the tax sparing provision, the re-
duced tax rate will be valuable only if income is not repatriated. With the
tax sparing provision, income can be repatriated without further taxation.
Hence, a U.S. multinational may have an incentive to repatriate income
more rapidly than it would have otherwise. Such a reaction on the part of
the U.S. multinational could lead to greater volatility in capital markets,
rather than less.
All this is not meant to take away from the important contribution of
the paper, which is the ﬁrst serious eﬀort to measure the eﬀect of tax spar-
ing on investment decisions. Moreover, the paper rather ingeniously gets
the most out of the data by using an instrumental variables approach to
address one of the problems just outlined—that of Japanese trade patterns
70 James R. Hines Jr.with Asian countries apart from tax sparing provisions. Still, the data limi-
tations lead one to conclude that the results of this paper are suggestive,
but do not yet provide a deﬁnitive answer to the question of whether and
by how much tax sparing aﬀects investment activities. This, in turn, sug-
gests that there remain a number of interesting ways in which future stud-
ies could advance research on tax sparing. Such studies will need to work
with a somewhat broader data set. With such a data set, recent techniques
developed using spatial econometric methods or ﬁxed eﬀects models could
be implemented. Such studies would be a valuable addition, and could
provide more assurance to policy makers who remain skeptical about the
value of tax sparing.
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